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2Abstract
Many mathematics problems can be solved in different ways or by using different strategies. Good 
knowledge of arithmetic principles is important for identifying and using strategies that are more 
sophisticated. For example, the problem ‘6 + 38 − 35’ can be solved through a shortcut strategy 
where the subtraction ‘38 − 35’ is performed before the addition ‘3 + 6 = 9’, a strategy which is 
derived from the arithmetic principle of associativity. However, both children and adults make 
infrequent use of this shortcut and the reasons for this are currently unknown. To uncover these 
reasons, new sensitive measures of strategy identification and use must first be developed, which 
was one goal of our research. We built a novel method to detect the time-point when individuals 
first identify an arithmetic strategy, based on a trial-by-trial response time data. Our second goal was 
to use this measure to investigate the contribution of one particular factor, attention, in the 
identification of the associativity shortcut. In two studies, we found that manipulating visual 
attention made no difference to the number of people who identified the shortcut, the trial number 
on which they first identified it, or their accuracy and response time for solving shortcut problems. 
We discuss the theoretical and methodological contribution of our findings, and argue that the origin 
of people’s difficulty with associativity shortcuts may lie beyond attention.
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3Introduction
The importance of conceptual knowledge
Arithmetic knowledge can be crudely divided into procedural and conceptual (Rittle-Johnson & 
Siegler, 1998), two broad categories of understanding that, whilst related, may be understood by an 
individual to different extents (Gilmore & Papadatou-Pastou, 2009). Procedural skills refer to the 
action sequences that are used to solve problems, for example, counting and decomposition. 
Conceptual knowledge refers to the understanding of principles and relationships that underlie a 
domain (Hiebert & Lefevre, 1986), for example, knowing that addition and subtraction have an 
opposite relation (the principle of inversion). Seven arithmetic principles are often discussed: 
identity, negation, complementarity, commutativity, inversion, equivalence and associativity 
(Kilpatrick, Swafford, & Findell, 2002). A solid grasp of these principles is key for success in 
mathematics. For example, conceptual knowledge enables children to progress from using less 
sophisticated arithmetic strategies such as counting, to those that are more efficient, such as 
decomposition (Bryant, Christie, & Rendu, 1999).
Our research focused on associativity, a principle thought to be important for aiding the transition 
from arithmetic to algebra and that may predict educational and employment success (Ladson-
Billings, 1997; Kilpatrick et al., 2002). Associativity is the principle that allows problems to be solved 
by first decomposing, and then recombining their problem sets (Canobi, Reeve, & Pattison, 1998), 
for example, solving ‘a + b − c’ by first performing ‘b − c’ and then adding the result to ‘a’. In other 
words, for some problems, the answer will be the same regardless of which pair of numbers is dealt 
with first. Different forms of the principle exist, such as addition only, ‘a + b + c = c + b + a’ (Canobi, 
2005), addition-subtraction, ‘a + b − c = b − c + a’, and multiplication-division, ‘a × b ÷ c = b ÷ c × a’ 
(Robinson & Ninowski, 2003). Problems with opposing operations (addition-subtraction, 
multiplication-division) are a dominant paradigm used to investigate how well an individual 
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4understands associativity (Robinson & Dube, 2017). We adhered to this by focusing specifically on 
addition-subtraction.
Methodological issues in measuring conceptual understanding
Methods for measuring conceptual knowledge sparks animated debate (Schneider & Stern, 2010). 
Associativity is no exception. One reason for this is that almost any mathematical task involves a 
combination of procedural and conceptual knowledge and therefore pure measures of conceptual 
understanding are difficult to develop. Existing methods broadly divide into explicit and implicit, 
both of which normally infer conceptual knowledge from the strategies used to solve unfamiliar 
problems. Explicit methods require individuals to explain or justify why strategies are appropriate, 
and implicit approaches infer strategy use from accuracy and solution latencies to different 
problems. For associativity, three-term (a + b − c) problems are commonly used (Klein & Bisanz, 
2000). Verbal reports of solving ‘a + b − c’ by performing the subtraction first and adding the result 
to ‘a’ allow the researcher to assume that the individual has applied some knowledge of 
associativity. That is, they have used their understanding of the principle to execute a ‘right-to-left’ 
strategy (hereafter a ‘shortcut’). For implicit measures, accuracy and response time can be 
compared between problems that are conducive and non-conducive to a shortcut (Edwards, 2013). 
Conducive problems such as ‘16 + 47 − 45’ encourage shortcut use by the subtraction being easier 
than the addition. Non-conducive problems do not encourage a shortcut, for example ‘36 + 27 − 45’, 
because solving the subtraction first offers less advantage. If conducive and non-conducive problems 
are equally challenging when solved through a left-to-right strategy, differences in accuracy and 
response time between the two problem types may indicate that an individual is using different 
strategies to solve them. If accuracy and response time are substantially better for conducive than 
non-conducive problems, it may be inferred that the individual has used the shortcut and has 
applied their knowledge of associativity. 
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5Neither of these methods (explicit, implicit) are perfect, and researchers have widely documented 
concerns with each (Prather & Alibali, 2009; Crooks & Alibali, 2014; Schneider & Stern, 2010; Rittle-
Johnson & Schneider, 2015; Faulkenberry, 2013). For example, explicit techniques rely on 
participants being aware of, remembering, and accurately reporting their strategies, which may not 
always give reliable results (Posner & Gertzog, 1982) and may not be suitable for some individuals 
(e.g. children). Implicit techniques of accuracy and response time imply but do not guarantee 
strategy use, but they can capture elements of conceptual understanding that an individual may be 
unaware of or unable to express (Bryant et al., 1999). As a result, researchers are encouraged to use 
multiple methods for measuring strategy use (Schneider & Stern, 2010), to provide greater 
justification for the tasks that they use (Crooks & Alibali, 2014), and to develop new measures where 
appropriate (Rittle-Johnson & Schneider, 2015). While some progress has been made (e.g. Thevenot 
& Oakhill, 2005; Thevenot & Oakhill, 2006), few have focused on developing new methods for 
measuring conceptually-derived strategy use on digit-based problems. Our research contributed to 
these goals by 1) developing a new tool to measure conceptual shortcut use, 2) incorporating both 
self-report and implicit measures, and 3) ensuring that the measure we used closely matched the 
specific aspect of the associativity shortcut strategy that we wished to test. The specific aspect that 
we wished to test was the time-point when an individual first used the strategy within a set of 
problems, hereafter ‘identification’.
Barriers to using conceptually-derived shortcuts
Knowledge of associativity is often compared to inversion, the simpler principle that addition-
subtraction and multiplication-division have opposite relations (Baroody, 2003). Inversion is often 
measured through simpler shortcut problems of the form ‘a + b − b’. Individuals who understand 
inversion know that the addition and subtraction cancel out, and that they can simply pick ‘a’ 
(Starkey & Gelman, 1989; Bisanz & LeFevre, 1990). Around 35 – 60% of children use inversion 
shortcuts by the age of 6 – 10 years (Watchorn et al., 2014; Robinson & Dubé, 2012, 2013) and 
Page 5 of 61 Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
DOI: 10.1177/1747021820905739
6match adults’ frequency of use by 14 years (Dubé, 2014). In comparison, the use of associativity 
shortcuts lags behind (Robinson & Dube, 2017). For children aged 6 – 10 years, use of the 
associativity shortcut is between 15 – 25%, a rate that remains low (approximately 30%) in early 
adolescence (11 – 13 years) and reaches only approximately 50% in adulthood (Dubé, 2014; Dubé & 
Robinson, 2010). Education practitioners have called for this situation to change (National 
Mathematics Advisory Panel, 2008). To do so, we first need to understand the reasons why 
associativity shortcut use is low, a topic that we now address.
There are many reasons why an individual may not use an associativity shortcut. These may be 
domain-specific, referring to the skills that are required only in arithmetic, or domain-general, 
referring to the skills required on a range of tasks (Fuchs et al., 2010). From a domain-specific 
perspective, it may be that some individuals have a poor understanding of associativity, or do not 
understand the principle at all. In other words, they may not understand that because some 
operations are related (e.g. addition and subtraction), they can be solved in different orders. 
Alternatively, it may be that they apply the principle in more grounded contexts, such as with words 
or concrete objects (Gilmore & Bryant, 2006), but not in more abstract contexts with digits. 
Furthermore, even with an understanding in both contexts, an individual may still choose to operate 
left-to-right, for example, if they are highly proficient in calculating (Newton, Star, & Lynch, 2010), or 
dislike the process of re-ordering operations (Robinson & Dubé, 2012). Such domain-specific factors 
may therefore hinder shortcut use.
From a domain-general perspective, attention, working memory, switching and inhibition are likely 
to be important for shortcut use. When an individual encounters a novel problem such as ‘a + b − c’, 
they may initially begin using a left-to-right strategy, a strategy that must be inhibited in order to use 
the shortcut (Robinson & Dubé, 2013). Separately, if the problem that follows has a different 
structure (e.g. ‘a − b + c’), the individual must then switch to a strategy that they did not use before. 
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7In everyday settings outside of the classroom, the arithmetic problems that individuals encounter 
are likely to be varied. Likewise, in research studies different arithmetic problems are usually 
presented in an intermixed manner. The result is that the most efficient strategy for solving the 
current problem could be completely different to the most efficient strategy for the previous 
problem, and therefore require switching skills to identify and execute it. Thus, in everyday life and 
in experimental studies, individuals are often required to hold multiple strategies in mind, inhibit 
default procedures, and to switch between them (Lemaire & Lecacheur, 2010; 2011). A failure in any 
one of these domain-general skills may therefore prevent shortcut use.  
Attention
Our research focused on the domain-general construct of attention because more than any other, it 
has frequently been suggested as important for identifying and executing conceptually-derived 
strategies. Attention consists of multiple components (Petersen & Posner, 2012; Robertson, Ward, 
Ridgeway, & Nimmo-Smith, 1996). Selective and spatial attention are relevant here because they are 
both likely to be required for using associativity shortcuts on visually-presented digit problems such 
as “26 + 48 − 45”. Selective attention refers to the prioritised processing of certain stimuli (Zentall, 
2005), such as a target word embedded among distractors (Johnston & Dark, 1986). Spatial attention 
refers to the prioritised processing of information at a relevant location (Kim & Cave, 1995) such as 
looking to the left or right in response to a sound being presented from that direction. Our goal was 
not to distinguish between selective and spatial attention as we would expect them to have a similar 
role in shortcut use, i.e. directing attention to the right-hand side and selecting ‘b − c’. Instead, our 
goal was to investigate the question of whether visual attention, as a global construct, is involved in 
associativity shortcut use.
Both theoretical and empirical work provide some indication that attention may be required to 
identify the associativity shortcut. Theoretically, models in the strategy literature (Lovett & 
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8Anderson, 1996; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993; Rieskamp & Otto, 2006) highlight the cognitive 
processes that might be required for using different arithmetic strategies. Of particular relevance is 
SCADS*, the Strategy Choice and Discovery Simulation Model* (Shrager & Siegler, 1998; Siegler & 
Araya, 2005), which was designed to predict the discovery of inversion shortcuts (‘a + b − b’). SCADS* 
suggests that six processes are required for discovering the shortcut, the first of which is the 
deployment of attention to the right-hand side to encode ‘b − b’. After discovery, the shortcut is 
primed for use such that subsequent trials require less attention to identify it. SCADS* has since 
been extrapolated to associativity (Robinson & LeFevre, 2012, p413), suggesting that the same 
mechanisms, including attention, may apply.
Empirically, three strands of research provide some, preliminary evidence that attention could be 
important for identifying associativity shortcuts (Landy & Goldstone, 2007a; Dubé & Robinson, 2010; 
Eaves, Attridge, & Gilmore, 2019). In the experimental studies by Landy & Goldstone (2007a, 2007b, 
2010) adults validated the equivalence of multi-term problems, and solved multi-term problems 
such as ‘2 + 3 × 4’ in conditions where the spacing within and between the operations was 
manipulated. When the operation with precedence (in this case multiplication) had narrow spacing 
(i.e. ‘2   +   3 × 4’), individuals solved problems more accurately, quickly, and made fewer precedence 
errors, compared to a condition with wide spacing (i.e. 2 + 3   ×   4). Gestalt principles (Wertheimer, 
1923) were used to explain their findings: items that are close in proximity are more likely to be 
grouped together, and selective attention directed to them as a whole ‘object’. Items further apart 
are more likely to be perceived as separate units, and not attended to as a whole object. 
Perceptually-driven biases of attention may therefore influence the order in which arithmetic 
operations are performed.
Second, in a classroom intervention study with adults, Eaves et al. (2019) found that individuals who 
solved ‘a + b − b’ inversion problems were more likely than individuals who solved ‘a + b − a’ 
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9inversion problems to subsequently use the associativity shortcut on ‘a + b − c’ problems. They 
proposed two mechanisms through which ‘a + b − b’ inversion problems helped individuals to 
identify the associativity shortcut. One was an attention mechanism, where ‘b − b’ directed attention 
to the location of the associativity shortcut, and one was a strategy validation mechanism, where 
performing ‘b − b’ first implicitly communicated that a right-to-left strategy was a valid approach on 
‘a + b − c’ associativity problems. However, they could not determine from their data which (if 
either) of these mechanisms was more likely. 
Finally, the experiment by Dubé & Robinson (2010) is the most relevant, because they directly 
manipulated spatial attention while adults solved inversion and associativity problems. In a 
between-subjects design, individuals were either primed to look to the left or right of the problem. 
In the left-prime condition, the left-most digits (e.g. 7 × 9 in the problem 7 × 9 ÷ 3) appeared on the 
screen 250ms before the whole problem and in the right-prime condition the right-most digits (e.g. 9 
÷ 3 in the problem 7 × 9 ÷ 3) appeared on the screen 250ms before the whole problem. They found 
that for inversion problems, accuracy and response time were better for those in the right-prime 
condition than the left-prime condition, but there was no difference between the conditions on 
associativity problems. They suggested that attention was involved in identifying inversion shortcuts, 
but that it was difficult to interpret the results on associativity problems because the shortcut was 
infrequently used (p.64). 
Further research is therefore warranted to investigate the role of attention in associativity shortcut 
use. While there is a theoretical rationale for the role of attention, the empirical evidence to date is 
preliminary and inconclusive. Our studies are the first thorough investigation into whether attention 
enables the identification of the conceptual associativity strategy on ‘a + b − c’ problems. 
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10
How to measure the role of attention in shortcut use
Implicit in the theories and studies above is an important distinction between shortcut identification 
and shortcut use. Identification we refer to as the processes involved in using the shortcut for the 
first time on a task or in a situation. Shortcut use we refer to as the processes involved in executing 
the shortcut after it has been identified in that task or situation. We argue that attention is 
important for shortcut identification. After the shortcut has been identified, the demand for 
attention on problems that are conducive to a shortcut may be less because the strategy can be 
executed in a predictable manner. In other words, attention may play an important role in the time 
leading up to the identification of the associativity shortcut, less so thereafter.     
As previously mentioned, there is a need to develop new measures of conceptual understanding and 
strategy use. For our research, we wanted to investigate the role of attention specifically in shortcut 
identification, and to do so, we needed a method that could separate identification from use. In two 
of the above studies (Landy & Goldstone, 2007; Dubé & Robinson, 2010), like most others in the 
literature, performance was measured by averaging data over many trials. This approach captures 
the processes involved in both identification and use; an individual’s accuracy and RT across all trials 
will reflect several factors including whether they identified a shortcut, when they identified it, and 
how well they executed the strategies both before and after identification. It may therefore be that 
attention is involved in shortcut identification, but that because average accuracy and RT measure 
both shortcut identification and use, they are not sensitive enough to detect its role. For inversion 
problems (Dubé & Robinson, 2010) this is less of an issue, as the two processes (identification and 
use) are more closely related. Once an individual has identified an inversion shortcut, there is 
nothing left to compute (i.e. there is nothing to ‘use’). For associativity problems however, there is a 
clearer distinction because applying the shortcut involves more steps; an individual must first 
identify the shortcut and then use it, and the former does not guarantee the latter. 
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11
We therefore built a new tool to measure identification, hereafter the ‘identification analytic’. The 
tool follows a microgenetic approach, an approach used for studying rapid changes in development 
by conducting high density observations in a narrow time-period (Siegler & Svetina, 2006). 
Microgenetic approaches afford the advantage of capturing precisely how and when change occurs 
(Siegler, 1995), which is what we wanted to achieve. 
We also wanted to capture the time-point of identification without asking individuals to describe the 
strategy that they had used after every single trial. As some have suggested (Haider, Gaschler, 
Vaterrodt, & Frensch, 2014; Watchorn et al., 2014), repeatedly asking an individual about how they 
were solving a problem may provide a hint that an alternative, more sophisticated strategy exists, 
which encourages them to identify it. Meta-cognitive studies provide some support for this (Flavell, 
1979), where encouraging individuals to reflect upon, and be consciously aware of the cognitive 
processes they are performing benefits their strategy performance (Carr & Jessup, 1995; Schoenfeld, 
1985; Ghatala, Levin, Pressley, & Goodwin, 1986; Mevarech & Fridkin, 2006; Mevarech & Kramarski, 
1997; Dewolf, Van Dooren, Ev Cimen, & Verschaffel, 2014; Babai, Shalev, & Stavy, 2015). We 
therefore wanted to capture identification as it naturally occurred, i.e. without encouraging or 
inducing discovery through subtle hints or self-reflection. 
The identification analytic is based on a technique used in the insight literature that was designed to 
capture if and when individuals identified a simpler way for solving ‘number reduction’ problems 
(Haider & Rose, 2007). Haider & Rose (2007) recorded the time participants took to complete 
problems where sequences of digits were presented one at a time, and participants were asked to 
identify what digit should come next based on ‘rules’ they had been taught prior to the experiment. 
What participants were not told was that some positions in the sequence were predictable and did 
not require using the rules to deduce the next number, while other positions were unpredictable 
and did require using the rules. If participants identified the underlying regularity, they could 
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respond efficiently at the predictable points in the sequence, i.e. without thinking about the rules 
they were given. Haider & Rose (2007) compared participants’ response times at the predictable and 
unpredictable positions in the sequence in live-time. If and when median response times at 
predictable positions fell below the confidence interval of the mean response time at unpredictable 
positions, participants were assessed to have discovered a regularity in the number sequence. 
We applied this logic to associativity problems to create a novel method that captures strategy 
identification using implicit, response time data, which is then corroborated by an explicit self-report 
at the end of the task. During the task, response time is compared between two types of problems, 
those that encourage shortcuts (conducive) and those that do not encourage shortcuts (non-
conducive), on a trial-by-trial basis. These two types of problems should be solved with similar speed 
if they are solved through the same strategy. However, if a shortcut is identified and used, conducive 
problems should be solved much more quickly than non-conducive problems. By comparing RT on a 
trial-by-trial basis, the identification analytic detects when a difference between the problem types 
emerges, and thus, when an individual first identifies and begins to use the shortcut.
The present studies
We aimed to investigate whether attention was involved in identifying associativity shortcuts by 
developing and implementing a new measure of conceptual-shortcut identification. More 
specifically, we investigated whether the promotion of attention to the right-hand side of 
associativity problems (the location of the ‘b − c’ shortcut) could influence the number of individuals 
who identified it and the time-point at which it was identified. Our measure more cleanly separates 
identification from use than the measures employed by  Dubé & Robinson (2010) and thus, our 
studies are a stronger test of the hypothesis that attention is important in the identification of the 
associativity shortcut.  
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Experiment 1
Method
Both studies were approved by the (name removed for blind review) University’s Ethics Approvals 
(Human Participants) Sub-committee (reference numbers C17-42, C17-70). Before the data were 
collected the hypotheses, designs, sample sizes, exclusion criteria and analysis plans were pre-
registered at https://aspredicted.org. The pre-registrations are available at 
http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=jm8vs9 and http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=8q6zz7. The 
scripts to run the experiments can be found at (https://doi.org/ 10.17028/rd.lboro.7533770 and 
https://doi.org/10.17028/rd.lboro.7533794). 
Participants
108 adults aged 18 – 59 years (71 female, 37 male, M = 28.71 years, SD = 10.89) participated. This 
sample size provides 80.37% power to detect a medium-sized effect in a chi-square analysis of three 
conditions. All participants were proficient in English and were not studying for, or had not studied 
for, a mathematics degree.
Participants were categorised into two groups based on how long they had studied mathematics: In 
the UK, all individuals study mathematics up to the age of 16 years (GCSE qualification), and some 
choose to study for one or two years more (A-level qualification). For consistency across different 
qualification systems, individuals who studied mathematics up to and including the age of 16 years 
were classed as GCSE achievers and those who studied mathematics beyond age 16 were classed as 
A-level achievers. All participants were naïve to the purpose of the experiment and were reimbursed 
for their time.
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Design
A between-subjects design was used: participants completed one of three conditions, left-prime, 
right-prime or control (no prime) conditions. Participants were assigned to the conditions through 
blocked random assignment: Two lists (one for A-level, one for GCSE-level achievers) of the numbers 
1, 2 and 3 (representing the three conditions) were created, and within each list the numbers were 
ordered randomly within blocks of three. This ensured that the number of participants, and the 
proportion of A-level to GCSE-level achievers was equal in each condition.
Materials and procedure
Our experiment was based on the method described by Dubé & Robinson (2010). Each trial began 
with a central fixation cross (500ms) followed by a three-term arithmetic problem (‘a + b − c’). In the 
left-prime condition, the ‘a + b’ operation was presented for 250ms, followed by the whole problem. 
In the right-prime condition, ‘b − c’ was presented for 250ms, followed by the whole problem. In the 
control condition there was no prime and the entire problem was presented at the same time 
(Figure 1). The experiment was run on a 15” laptop, and responses were made using the in-built 
keyboard and an external USB-keypad. Audio was presented to the experimenter through 
headphones (Sony MDRZX310) and a USB-dictaphone was used to record participants’ verbal 
responses to interview questions that were asked at the end of the experiment.
(Insert Figure 1 here)
Participants were told that they would be presented with approximately 40 mathematics problems, 
and that their task was to solve each problem in their head and to say their answer out loud. They 
were asked to press the spacebar at the same time as vocalising their answer, and afterwards the 
experimenter would enter their response via the USB-keypad. They were verbally told that both 
Page 14 of 61Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
DOI: 10.1177/1747021820905739
15
accuracy and time were recorded, but not to worry or panic, and to just try their best. Strategies 
were not mentioned in the instructions and feedback was not given.
Each problem remained on the screen until participants responded. Participants completed three 
practice trials with non-conducive stimuli before commencing the experiment, to familiarise 
themselves with the equipment, procedure and task. The non-conducive stimuli increased in 
difficulty as the practice trials progressed (‘9 + 2 − 5’, ‘3 + 19 − 8’ and ‘39 + 14 − 27’) and primes were 
not presented. 
At the end of the experiment, participants were interviewed about the strategies they used to solve 
the problems (https://doi.org/10.17028/rd.lboro.7533764)). First, they were asked “Can you tell 
me about how you were solving the problems?”, to which they responded unprompted until they 
had finished. Most people could be categorised from this response. If their description was 
insufficient or unclear, they were asked to “Describe in more detail”, or to think of an example to 
help describe what they were saying. Participants were then asked questions about their strategy 
preference; they were shown the written problem “46 + 38 − 35” and the left-to-right and right-to-
left strategy were described in writing and verbally by the experimenter. They were asked to select 
the strategy they preferred and explain why. They were then asked questions about their reason(s) 
for use or non-use of the shortcut including “Did you ever use a right-to-left strategy?”, “If not, why 
not?”, “If yes, approximately when did you start to use the strategy? Finally, they were asked 
whether they had been aware of the prime and/or spacing manipulation. 
Stimuli
Three-term arithmetic problems of the form ‘a + b − c’ were created, half of which were conducive 
to an associativity shortcut and half of which were non-conducive. 46 problems were selected for 
use in both studies (see https://doi.org/10.17028/rd.lboro.7533764) that met pre-defined criteria 
(below). The problems were presented in the same order for all participants. 
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Conducive problems
Conducive stimuli (e.g. ‘43 + 38 − 35’) were designed to be similar in difficulty to each other, and to 
have variety. To ensure that the stimuli were similar in difficulty, the following criteria were 
imposed:
 ‘a’, ‘b’ and ‘c’ were all double-digits.
 The right-hand side, ‘b − c’, resulted in a small positive integer (2 to 6), which was always 
smaller than the smallest addend (‘a’ or ‘b’).
 ‘b − c’ did not involve a decade boundary cross or a borrow operation.
 The left-hand side, ‘a + b’, resulted in a double-digit number whose calculation involved a 
decade boundary cross and a carry operation.
Non-conducive problems 
For each conducive stimulus, a non-conducive stimulus was created (e.g. ‘58 + 23 − 35’). Stimuli were 
therefore made in pairs, to ensure that they were of similar difficulty assuming a left-to-right 
procedure1. For example, the counterpart for the conducive stimulus ‘44 + 38 − 33’ was ‘58 + 24 − 
33’. Non-conducive stimuli were defined as follows:
 The sum of the interim addition (‘a + b’) and the value of the subtrahend (‘c’) matched 
conducive stimuli.
 ‘a + b’ involved a decade boundary cross and a carry operation.
 ‘b − c’ involved a decade boundary cross. 
 The size of ‘b − c’ ranged between -7 to -19 and between +19 to +24.
 The size of ‘a − c’ ranged between -7 to -18 and between +18 to +25. 
For both the conducive and non-conducive stimuli, none of the operands contained a zero or 1, and 
none were identical. None of the answers to the problems, or interim solutions (‘a + b’ and ‘b − c’) 
1 Post-hoc analyses of accuracy and RT confirmed that the conducive and non-conducive problems 
were of statistically equivalent difficulty if solved through a left-to-right strategy.
Page 16 of 61Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
DOI: 10.1177/1747021820905739
17
equalled 0 or a decade boundary. The sum of the interim addition (a + b) ranged from 61 − 84, and 
‘c’ ranged from 23 − 47. The sum of the interim addition and the value of the subtraction were not 
paired together more than once, and no more than two problems had the same answer. 
Building a measure of identification
We built a tool, the ‘identification analytic’ in PsychoPy (Peirce et al., 2019) to detect when 
individuals first switched from solving the problems using a left-to-right procedure to using an 
associativity shortcut. This switch is referred to as the ‘Identification Point’ (IP), depicted in Figure 2. 
The analytic was based on techniques used in implicit learning studies (Haider & Rose, 2007), where 
changes in behaviour have been inferred from trial-by-trial analyses of response times.
(Insert Figure 2 here)
On each trial, response time (RT) was recorded. On the non-conducive trials, rolling means, standard 
deviations and 99.9% confidence intervals of the non-conducive RT data were calculated. For the 
first conducive trial, absolute RT was recorded. For the second, the mean RT was calculated and 
recorded. For the third conducive trial onwards, the median RT of the three most recent conducive 
trials was calculated and recorded (henceforth a ‘lag-3 median filter’). When the conducive median 
(or mean on the second stimulus) fell below the lower-endpoint of the confidence interval of the 
non-conducive mean, a ‘trigger’ was generated. With a lag-3 median, triggers only occurred if two of 
three RTs were below the confidence interval. Three consecutive triggers defined the IP.
Pilot study
The analytic was piloted on 42 individuals, using the procedure described above. Twenty of the 
participants were told of the two main strategies that could be used to solve ‘a + b − c’ stimuli. They 
were instructed to use a left-to-right procedure on each trial up to a point in the trial sequence when 
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the experimenter would say the word ‘switch’. At this point, they were asked to use the shortcut. 
Twenty-two participants were uninstructed in how to solve ‘a + b − c’ stimuli, and they completed 
the trials without any information on strategy use. During the trial sequence, an audible tone played 
to the experimenter through headphones whenever a trigger occurred. Three consecutive triggers 
(the IP) signalled to the experimenter that the participant may have switched strategy and that they 
could interrupt them to ask questions. Upon interruption, participants were asked to describe how 
they had been solving the problems, whether they had changed strategy, and if so, how and when 
they had changed strategy. If they were not interrupted, they were asked the questions at the end of 
the task. Note that participants were not interrupted during Experiments 1 and 2, only during the 
pilot testing. 
The pilot data were explored to investigate whether participants’ self-reports corresponded to their 
IP recorded by the analytic. The analytic correctly identified a strategy switch for all 20 instructed 
participants, although 3 of the participants had IPs before the instruction to switch. For the naïve 
participants, it correctly identified a strategy switch for 14 individuals and it did not ‘miss’ a strategy 
switch (i.e. there was no-one who self-reported switching but did not have an IP). Two naïve 
participants had IPs much before the timepoint that they estimated their switch to have occurred, 
and four had IPs but self-reported that they did not identify the shortcut (hereafter ‘false alarms’). It 
could be that these false alarms are people who used the shortcut unconsciously or did not provide 
an accurate self-report. However, participants were always able to describe the strategy they had 
used clearly, in detail, and with certainty. We therefore judge their self-reports to be reliable. It may 
alternatively be the case that they became much faster on conducive problems without changing 
strategy and this led to the analytic giving an IP despite the participants’ strategy not changing.
In an attempt to reduce the number of false alarms, we refined the criteria of the IP. The IP was 
defined as the trial number of the first of three consecutive conducive trials with an RT median (or 
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mean on the second stimulus) that was 1) below the 99.9% confidence interval of the rolling non-
conducive mean, 2) at least 20% less than the rolling non-conducive mean, and 3) at least 20% less 
than the final non-conducive mean (the mean after all the trials had been presented). With these 
criteria, there were 20 opportunities for an IP to be identified, with the earliest possible IP on the 
second conducive stimulus and the latest possible IP on the 21st conducive stimulus (participants 
who identify on the first conducive stimulus would therefore be detected by the analytic and 
assigned an IP on the 2nd conducive stimulus). After implementing the revised criteria on the pilot 
data, two of the false alarms (i.e. two people who self-reported not identifying the shortcut but who 
did have an IP) were correctly classed as non-identifiers, and all of the identifiers were still correctly 
categorised as identifiers (i.e. no ‘misses’ were incurred with the additional criteria). 
The pilot study therefore demonstrated that the analytic correctly classified most individuals as 
identifiers or non-identifiers of the shortcut strategy and for the identifiers it captured the point of 
shortcut identification, making it suitable for use in the experiment. However, because there was a 
risk of some false alarms, we combined the analytic with a post-task interview about strategy use in 
the full experiments (Experiments 1 and 2).
Outcome measures
There were six dependent variables, 1) categorisation as an identifier or non-identifier, 2) the trial 
number of identification, 3) accuracy of all of the problems solved (i.e. problems both before and 
after the IP), 4) response time of all of the problems solved (i.e. problems both before and after the 
IP), 5) accuracy of the problems solved after the IP and 6) response time of the problems solved 
after the IP.
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Results
In this experiment, participants solved a series of “a + b − c” problems in one of three conditions. In 
two of the conditions, their attention was biased to the left or right using a 250ms prime (‘left-
prime’ and ‘right-prime’ condition respectively). In the other condition no prime was presented 
(‘control’ condition). We begin by presenting the results of our pre-registered analyses, followed by 
our exploratory analyses that were not pre-registered. We then briefly discuss our results, and our 
rationale for Experiment 2. The data for Experiment 1 can be found at 
(https://doi.org/10.17028/rd.lboro.7533755.
Pre-registered analyses
It was hypothesised that 1) the number of identifiers and non-identifiers would differ between the 
conditions, 2) for those who identified the shortcut, there would be a difference between the 
conditions in the trial number on which it was identified, 3) when reaction time was averaged across 
all trials, there would be a difference between the conditions, and 4) when reaction time was 
averaged across trials after the identification point, there would be no difference between the 
conditions. Analyses for each of these hypotheses are now presented. 
Our hypotheses derive from the fact that we thought attention enabled the identification of the 
associativity shortcut, and that attention was less important in the use of the shortcut after it had 
been identified. This argument forms the distinction between hypotheses 3 and 4. If attention was 
more important for identification than use, we would expect a difference in accuracy and RT 
between the conditions when we included all of the trials (hypothesis 3) because there would be 
more trials on which the shortcut had been used in the right-prime condition than in the control 
condition. We would not expect this when analysing the trials after the IP, as accuracy and RT on 
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those trials just reflect use (hypothesis 4), which we would expect to be equally efficient across 
conditions. The analysis for hypothesis 3 also allows us to compare our results to those of Dubé & 
Robinson (2010), who analysed accuracy and RT across intermixed blocks of trials. 
Number of identifiers
Participants were classed as identifiers if they had an IP and self-reported using the shortcut when 
questioned at the end of the experiment. If not, they were classed as non-identifiers. A small 
number of false alarms did occur: these were 15 occasions where an IP occurred, but the individual 
did not self-report identifying the shortcut, so they were classed as non-identifiers2. There was one 
person who self-reported identifying the shortcut on the last trial of the experiment and did not 
therefore have an IP; due to the criteria of the analytic, a trigger could not, by definition, occur on 
the last two stimuli. This participant was classed as a non-identifier. 
Table 1 displays the frequencies of identifiers and non-identifiers. A 3*2 chi-square test found that 
the frequency of identifiers to non-identifiers was not significantly different between the conditions, 
X2 (2, N = 108) = 3.92, p = 0.141, Cramers V = 0.19. 
(Insert Table 1 here)
Trial numbers of the identification point
For those who were classed as identifiers, the trial number of their identification point was analysed. 
Table 2 displays the results.
(Insert Table 2 here)
2 The results are unchanged if these individuals are classed as identifiers
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The trial number data in the right-prime condition were significantly positively skewed. A Kruskal-
Wallis test was therefore performed, which had three levels (left-prime, right-prime, control). No 
significant difference was found between the conditions in the conducive trial number of 
identification, X2 (2, N = 61) = 3.67, p = 0.159, or the total trial number of identification, X2 (2, N = 61) 
= 3.67, p = 0.159.
Response time across all trials
For those who were classed as identifiers, median RT of the correctly solved problems across all 
trials were calculated (Table 3). 
(Insert Table 3 here)
A 3*2 mixed ANOVA was performed on median RTs, with condition (left-prime, right-prime, control) 
and problem type (conducive, non-conducive) as between and within-subject factors respectively. 
There was a main effect of problem type, F(1, 58) = 159.68, p<0.001, p2 = 0.73, where conducive 
problems were solved quicker than non-conducive problems. There was no main effect of condition, 
F(2, 58) = 0.99, p = 0.377, p2 = 0.03, and no significant interaction between problem type and 
condition, F(2, 58) = 1.00, p = 0.373, p2 = 0.03. This analysis was repeated using all participants’ 
data, identifiers and non-identifiers, and the same result emerged. There was a main effect of 
problem type, F(1, 105) = 65.74, p<0.001, p2 = 0.39, no main effect of condition, F(2, 105) = 1.16, p = 
0.318, p2 = 0.02, and no significant interaction between problem type and condition, F(2, 105) = 
0.17, p = 0.842, p2 < 0.01. 
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Accuracy across all the trials 3
For those who were classed as identifiers, the mean percent of correctly solved problems across all 
trials were calculated. Accuracy data are displayed in Table 3. A 3*2 mixed ANOVA was performed, 
with condition (left-prime, right-prime, control) and problem type (conducive, non-conducive) as 
between and within-subject factors respectively. There was a main effect of problem type, F(1, 58) = 
32.67, p<0.001, p2 = 0.36, where conducive problems were solved more accurately than non-
conducive problems. There was no main effect of condition, F(2, 58) = 0.41, p = 0.665, p2 = 0.01, 
and no interaction between problem type and condition, F(2, 58) = 0.09, p = 0.910, p2 < 0.01. This 
analysis was repeated using all participants’ data, identifiers and non-identifiers, and the same result 
emerged. There was a main effect of problem type, F(1, 105) = 15.65, p<0.001, p2 = 0.13, no main 
effect of condition, F(2, 105) = 0.38, p = 0.682, p2 = 0.01, and no significant interaction between 
problem type and condition, F(2, 105) = 0.56, p = 0.572, p2 = 0.01.  
Response time for the trials after the IP
For those who were classed as identifiers, median RT of the correctly solved trials after the IP were 
calculated. The data were analysed for a) statistical equivalence and b) statistical difference, 
between the three conditions (left-prime, right-prime, control) separately for each problem type 
(conducive, non-conducive). For each analysis, the alpha levels were adjusted for the number of 
comparisons (0.05/6 = 0.008) and the result can be found in Supplementary Material A (Table A1). 
To test for equivalence, we used the two one-sided tests (TOST) procedure described by Lakens 
(2017). This test identifies whether the data significantly support the null hypothesis. Non-significant 
results using null hypothesis significance tests do not do this because a failure to accept the 
alternative hypothesis does not evidence that the null hypothesis is likely to be true. Equivalence 
tests however, are one approach that can (Harms & Lakens, 2018). The TOST procedure works by 
3 We pre-registered analysis on RT but not accuracy. However, we present the two analyses together for 
readability. The outcomes of both analyses are the same.
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specifying an upper and lower equivalence bound based on the smallest effect size of interest and 
uses two t-tests to assess whether the observed effect falls above the lower-bound and below the 
upper-bound. If it does, the difference between the two groups or conditions from which the effect 
was derived are deemed to be statistically equivalent.
In our analyses, the upper and lower confidence bounds (Cohens d) were set to ±0.8 for each 
pairwise comparison, to give a large range within which our results could fall, i.e. a liberal criterion of 
equivalence. For statistical difference, independent t-tests were performed. A summary of the 
output can be found in the Supplementary Material. None of the comparisons were statistically 
equivalent (p>0.008 for all comparisons) and none were significantly different (p>0.008 for all 
comparisons). Collectively, this is an ‘undetermined’ outcome (Lakens, 2017): The conditions were 
not significantly different or statistically equivalent.  
Accuracy for the trials after the IP 4
For those who were classed as identifiers, accuracy of the trials after the IP were calculated. The 
data were also analysed for a) statistical equivalence and b) statistical difference, in the same way 
that the RT data were. For each analysis, the alpha levels were adjusted for the number of 
comparisons (0.05/6 = 0.008). None of the comparisons were statistically equivalent (p > 0.008 for all 
comparisons) and none were significantly different (p>0.008 for all comparisons, see Table A2 in 
Supplementary Material A). As per the RT data, this is an ‘undetermined’ outcome (Lakens, 2017).
Validity of the analytic
To establish the validity of the analytic, median correct RTs were compared before and after the IP 
for participants who identified the shortcut. If the analytic correctly identifies the point where 
participants switched to using an associativity shortcut, we would expect median RT for the 
4 We pre-registered analysis on RT but not accuracy. However, we present the two analyses together for 
readability. The outcomes of both analyses are the same.
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conducive problems to significantly differ before and after the IP. We would expect this difference in 
RT to be significantly larger than any difference on the non-conducive problems. A 2*2 within-
subjects ANOVA was performed, with problem type (conducive, non-conducive) and time (before IP, 
after IP) as the factors. There was a main effect of problem type, F(1, 54) = 126.44, p<0.001, p2 = 
0.70, where conducive problems were solved quicker than non-conducive problems. There was a 
main effect of time, F(1, 54) = 60.85, p<0.001, p2 = 0.53, where problems were solved quicker after 
the IP, and there was a significant interaction between problem type and time, F(1, 54) = 20.63, 
p<0.001, p2 = 0.28. The interaction indicates that the improvement in RT after the IP was 
significantly larger for conducive problems (circa 5.3 seconds) than for non-conducive problems 
(circa 1.8 seconds).
Exploratory analyses (not pre-registered)
To explore the extent to which the data supported our hypotheses regarding the difference between 
the priming conditions, all hypotheses were tested with Bayesian analyses and all showed anecdotal 
to strong evidence (Jeffreys, 1961) in favour of the null hypothesis (BF10’s from 0.09 to 0.49).
Discussion
Participants solved three-term problems either in a condition where their attention was 
manipulated to the left, to the right, or in no direction. Attention was biased by presenting “a + b” or 
“b − c” for 250ms before the onset of the whole problem. Our theory was that attention would be 
important for identifying the associativity shortcut and less important for using it. In other words, we 
thought that attention would affect whether and when a person first identified the shortcut, but it 
would have little effect on the accuracy and speed with which they executed it after they had done 
so. We therefore measured performance in terms of whether the individual was an identifier or not, 
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the trial number of identification (if they were an identifier) and the accuracy and RT with which 
they solved the problems. We hypothesised that there would be differences among the conditions 
for the variables that captured more of the processes involved in identification (number of 
identifiers, trial number of identification and RT for all the problems correctly solved). We 
hypothesised that there would be no difference among the conditions for the variables that 
captured the processes involved in using the shortcut (RT after the point of identification). 
Contrary to our hypotheses, we found no evidence that attention influenced the number of people 
who identified the shortcut, the trial number on which they identified it, or the accuracy and RT for 
solving the problems. Thus, attention may not be as important a factor in identification as we 
originally thought. However, we reasoned that attention might still influence shortcut identification, 
and that our study might not have been powerful enough to detect it. In particular, the attention 
manipulation (250ms prime) was relatively subtle and may have been insufficient to change the 
behaviour of enough participants. Indeed, in some of the post-experiment interviews, some 
participants voluntarily commented that the prime had influenced the strategy they used to solve 
the conducive problems, while others commented that they did not notice it. Thus, the attention 
manipulation may have encouraged identification for some, but not enough people. In Experiment 2 
we improved this by using a stronger attention manipulation.
Experiment 2
Method
Participants
108 adults aged 18 – 56 years (76 female, 32 male, M= 22.56, SD = 7.59) participated, using the same 
recruitment criteria as Experiment 1. 
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Design
A between-subjects design was used. Participants completed one of three conditions, the left-prime, 
right-prime or control (no-prime) condition. As per Experiment 1, participants were assigned to the 
conditions through blocked random assignment, and the proportion of A-level to GCSE-level 
achievers was equal in each condition.
Materials and procedure
The procedure was the same as Experiment 1. Participants mentally solved the conducive and non-
conducive problems, vocalised their answer out loud and pressed the spacebar at the same time. 
The experimenter recorded their answers using an external USB-keypad. The stimuli were presented 
in the same order as in Experiment 1, except for one stimulus which was moved to earlier in the trial 
sequence in an attempt to reduce the false alarm rate of Experiment 1.
To create stronger attentional biases than Experiment 1, the left-prime and right-prime conditions 
were created by manipulating three factors. First, as per Experiment 1, the temporal prime (‘a + b’ or 
‘b − c’) was presented for 250ms before the onset of the whole problem in the left and right 
conditions respectively. Second, the spacing of the subexpressions were altered. In the left-prime 
condition, the spacing within ‘a + b’ was narrow (1 space, 6mm) and the spacing within ‘b − c’ was 
wide (3 spaces, 18mm), while in the right-prime condition, ‘b − c’ was narrowly spaced, and ‘a + b’ 
widely spaced. Finally, the position of the ‘+’ and ‘−’ were shifted: the ‘−’ was shifted towards the ‘c’ 
in the left-prime condition (e.g. ‘42 + 39   − 33’), while ‘+’ was shifted towards the ‘a’ in the right-
prime condition (e.g. ‘42 +   39 − 33’). In all, these manipulations had the perceptual effect of making 
the ‘a + b’ or ‘b − c’ more salient. Similar to previous studies (Landy & Goldstone, 2007, 2010; Landy 
et al., 2008), the digits were 1cm in height and 6-7mm in width, and participants were sat 
approximately 55cm from the screen.
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Outcome measures
There were three pre-registered primary dependent variables, 1) categorisation as an identifier or 
non-identifier, 2) categorisation as an early identifier or a not an early identifier, and 3) the percent 
of conducive trials remaining after the IP. Accuracy and median RT of the correctly solved problems 
for all the trials presented were also recorded. 
The early-identifier and percent use variables are new, in that we did not use them in Experiment 1. 
We incorporated them in Experiment 2 because we thought they might be more sensitive to the 
attention manipulation. For example, we thought attention might be more important for early 
identification rather than identification at any point during the trial sequence, where an ‘early 
identifier’ is someone who identifies the shortcut on the second or third conducive stimulus. We also 
thought that if we could include non-identifiers in our measure of trial number, the variable would 
be more informative and might be more likely to show an effect of the attention manipulation. We 
therefore created a different DV, where trial number was converted to the percent of trials 
remaining after the point of identification. This allowed for all participants to be included and made 
the measure continuous.
Results
We present the results of our pre-registered inferential and Bayesian analyses and then briefly 
discuss our results. The data for Experiment 2 can be found at 
https://doi.org/10.17028/rd.lboro.7533755.
Again, our rationale was that attention would be important for the identification of the associativity 
shortcut, less so for using the shortcut thereafter. We hypothesised that for the variables which 
captured more of the processes of identification, there would be a difference between the 
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conditions. More specifically, 1) the frequency of identifiers and non-identifiers would differ 
between the conditions, 2) the number of early identifiers and non-early identifiers would differ 
between the conditions and 3) the percent of trials after the IP would differ between the conditions. 
Because accuracy and RT across all of the trials capture both processes, we also expected these to be 
significantly different between the conditions. We now present our analyses for each hypothesis.
Number of identifiers
Participants were classed as identifiers or non-identifiers and Table 4 displays the result.
(Insert Table 4 here)
A 3*2 chi-square test found that the frequencies of identifiers to non-identifiers was not significantly 
different between the conditions, X2 (2, N = 108) = 0.52, p = 0.772, Cramers V = 0.07. Bayesian 
analyses indicated that there was moderate evidence in support of the null hypothesis, with a BF10 of 
0.09.
It should be noted that the false alarm and miss rates in Experiment 2 were similar to Experiment 1, 
with 13 false alarms5 and 1 miss in Experiment 2 (there were 15 false alarms and no misses in 
Experiment 1). 
Number of early identifiers
There were five early identifiers each in the left-prime and right-prime conditions, and three in the 
control condition. These frequencies were not significantly different, X2 (2, N = 108) = 0.70, p = 
0.705, Cramers V = 0.08. Bayesian analyses indicated that there was moderate evidence in support 
of the null hypothesis, with a BF10 of 0.04.
5 The results are unchanged if these individuals are classed as identifiers
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Percent of conducive trials after the IP
The data were not normally distributed, and a Kruskal-Wallis test using all participants’ data 
(identifiers and non-identifiers) found no significant difference between the conditions, X2 (2) = 0.38, 
p = 0.827. The mean percent of conducive trials after the IP was 44.07 (SD = 41.95) for the right-
prime condition, 40.53 (SD = 42.58) for the left-prime condition and 36.24 (SD = 41.92) for the 
control condition. A one-way between-subjects Bayesian ANOVA indicated that there was moderate 
evidence in support of the null hypothesis, with a BF10 of 0.11. 
RT and accuracy for all of the trials
Median RT of the correctly solved problems and mean accuracy were analysed for all of the trials 
presented for all of the participants (identifiers and non-identifiers). For RT, a 3*2 mixed ANOVA 
with condition (left-prime, right-prime, control) and problem type (conducive, non-conducive) as 
between and within-subject factors respectively identified a main effect of problem type, F(1, 105) = 
61.96, p<0.001, p2 = 0.37, where conducive problems were solved quicker than non-conducive 
problems, no main effect of condition, F(2, 105) = 2.16, p = 0.121, p2 = 0.04, and no significant 
interaction between problem type and condition, F(2, 105) = 0.66, p = 0.519, p2 = 0.01. For 
accuracy, there was a main effect of problem type, F(1, 105) = 20.37, p<0.001, p2 = 0.16, where 
conducive problems were solved more accurately than non-conducive problems, no main effect of 
condition, F(2, 105) = 0.66, p = 0.520, p2 = 0.01, and no significant interaction between problem 
type and condition, F(2, 105) = 0.40, p = 0.672, p2 = 0.01. 
Discussion
Experiment 2 used the same design and procedure as Experiment 1, but with a more powerful 
manipulation of attention and dependent variables that we judged to be potentially more sensitive 
measures of identification. We hypothesised that there would be a difference among the conditions 
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in terms of the number of identifiers, the number of early identifiers, and the percent of trials that 
the associativity shortcut was used on (indexed by the percent of trials remaining after the IP). 
Accuracy and RT for all of the trials were also recorded and analysed, on the assumption that they 
captured some of the processes of identification and might therefore differ between the conditions. 
However, Experiment 2 found no evidence that manipulating visual attention to the left or right of 
three-term problems influenced the identification of associativity shortcuts. The number of 
identifiers, the number of early identifiers, and the percent of trials remaining after the IP did not 
significantly differ between the conditions, and neither did accuracy or RT. Thus, in two studies we 
found no evidence that attention plays a role in the identification of associativity shortcuts with a 
moderate or larger effect size.
General discussion
We developed a new tool for measuring the application of conceptual knowledge in solving 
arithmetic problems. Our tool measures when an individual first identifies an arithmetic strategy on 
a task. In this case the strategy was an associativity shortcut and the task was one where problems 
that were conducive to a shortcut and problems that were non-conducive to a shortcut were 
presented in an intermixed order. This tool was implemented in two studies that, for the first time, 
captured strategy change on a trial-by-trial basis using implicit (RT) data without relying on explicit 
self-reports after each problem was solved. In both studies, the tool proved effective in pinpointing 
associativity shortcut identification, although we found no evidence that manipulations designed to 
draw participants’ visual attention to parts of the problem changed the rates of identification. We 
discuss the methodological and theoretical contributions of our research below.  
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Methodological contribution
A variety of explicit and implicit tasks have been used to measure the understanding of different 
arithmetic principles, all of which may capture subtly different facets of knowledge (Crooks & Alibali, 
2014). To maximise the validity of their assessments, scholars have been encouraged to use multiple 
measures (Schneider & Stern, 2010), to give more thought and consideration to the method they 
select, and to make explicit how their tasks align with their theory and definition of the principle that 
they are studying (Crooks & Alibali, 2014). The new measure that we developed and implemented in 
the current studies is a direct response to these calls. 
First, we implemented both implicit and explicit measures. Explicit measures may be restricted to 
those who are aware of the strategy that they used and can express that strategy accurately, while 
implicit methods are not. However, implicit methods can only infer strategy use and cannot 
guarantee it, and explicit techniques can compensate for this by providing some reassurance of 
strategy choice. By combining the result of the identification analytic (an implicit measure) with self-
report data (an explicit measure), we drew on the benefits of both techniques. 
Second, we selected dependent measures that specifically matched the mechanism through which 
we thought attention would operate. Our rationale was that attention was more important for 
determining whether and when an individual identifies the shortcut (Siegler & Araya, 2005), and less 
important for determining how accurately and efficiently they solved shortcut problems after they 
had identified it. Existing measures of shortcut use average accuracy and response time across 
multiple trials, which reflect the cognitive processes of both identification and use. For example, an 
individual’s average RT over a sequence of conducive problems will reflect whether they identified 
the shortcut, when they identified the shortcut, and the speed with which they execute arithmetic 
strategies. To obtain a purer measure of identification, we therefore built a new a tool that could 
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separate identification from use. As a result, we had a closer match between our outcome measures 
and our hypothesis. 
Our tool blends the logic of the microgenetic method with theories of insight and implicit learning 
(Siegler, 2006; Haider & Rose, 2007), to measure the trial number on which individuals first identify 
and use an associativity shortcut. While a handful of microgenetic studies have tracked the 
development of conceptual knowledge and changes in strategy use (Rittle-Johnson, Siegler, & Alibali, 
2001; Robinson & Dubé, 2009; Siegler, 1987; Geary, 1990; Siegler & Svetina, 2006), only one 
monitored performance with good temporal resolution, that is, on a trial-by-trial basis (Siegler & 
Stern, 1998). Siegler & Stern (1998) monitored the use of inversion shortcuts, based on self-reports. 
However, it has been suggested that providing self-reports after every problem may hint that 
alternative strategies exist (Haider et al., 2014; Watchorn et al., 2014) or cause participants to 
become doubtful of their previously used strategies (Siegler & Stern, 1998, p362). Siegler & Stern 
(1998) addressed this by capping the number of consecutive self-reports to three. However, to 
completely circumvent the issue, shortcut identification must be captured without any self-reports 
being given during the task. To the best of our knowledge, our tool is the first to achieve this.
Our tool could be helpful for researchers investigating the development of conceptual knowledge, 
strategy switching and the microgenetics of cognitive change. The analytic monitors the time taken 
to solve problems that can be answered primarily through two strategies, where the difference in 
solution time between those two strategies is not trivial. It could therefore be used to investigate 
other principles that lend themselves to a small number of strategies that differ in efficiency. For 
example, it could be used to investigate the identification of the commutativity principle on 
problems such as ‘7 + 19 + 3’, where a strategy of adding the first and last addend to 10 is more 
efficient than operating left-to-right. Or, it could be used to investigate commutativity on sequences 
of two-addend problems such as ‘27 + 16’ after solving ‘16 + 27’, where a strategy of thinking back to 
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the previous trial negates computation on the current trial, making it substantially more efficient 
than calculating an answer to each problem. In any case, if solution time for a problem of interest 
suddenly declines, and does not immediately revert, it may be inferred that a person has switched 
from using one strategy to another. And if this change is specific to problems with a certain 
characteristic (i.e. conducive to one strategy) then the change is unlikely to be due to factors such as 
improved calculation speed. We also note that specifics of our metric could be tailored to 
researchers’ individual needs. For example, the confidence interval could be calculated over 
different numbers of trials (e.g. over 3 trials, 10 trials, or after all trials have been presented) 
depending on the sensitivity and specificity of the tool that they require. Thus, our tool could be 
used and adapted by researchers to implicitly measure the identification of arithmetic strategies and 
the time-point of cognitive change.
Theoretical contribution
Our findings extend three strands of research. First, SCADS* (Siegler & Araya, 2005), a computational 
model intended to predict the discovery of inversion shortcuts, included attention as the first of six 
cognitive processes required for shortcut discovery. Our findings suggest that the claims to apply the 
exact same cognitive mechanisms involved on inversion problems to associativity problems may be 
inappropriate. Separately, multiple studies have manipulated the spacing within problems that have 
three or more digits, akin to our method in Experiment 2 (Jiang, Cooper, & Alibali, 2014; Landy & 
Goldstone, 2007; Landy et al., 2008). Those studies found that on problems such as ‘2 + 3 × 4’, 
operations with narrow spaces were performed before the operations with wider spaces. Our 
findings suggest that similar attention manipulations do not have the same effect on ‘a + b − c’ 
problems. Finally, and most relevant to our research, is a preliminary study by Dubé & Robinson 
(2010), who described using an experimental manipulation that we implemented in Experiment 1. 
They found that priming the location of the shortcut improved RT on inversion problems but not 
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associativity problems. Our findings support and extend their conclusion by being the first to 
rigorously test whether attention is important for identifying the associativity shortcut. 
We found no evidence for the role of attention in the identification of the associativity shortcut, and 
our Bayesian analyses suggest that the evidence was always in favour of the null hypothesis. This 
null result is important to communicate for three reasons. First, the result indicates that models 
from the inversion literature (e.g. SCADS*) and the findings from multi-term problems more 
generally (Jiang et al., 2014; Landy & Goldstone, 2007; Landy et al., 2008) do not necessarily apply to 
‘a + b − c’ associativity problems. Second, they help to answer unresolved questions in the discussion 
of other studies. For example, Eaves et al., (2019) proposed that attention and/or strategy validation 
mechanisms could explain why ‘a + b − b’ inversion problems promoted associativity shortcut use on 
‘a + b − c’ problems, and the findings from this study imply that an attention mechanism is less likely. 
Finally, our results provide good evidence that there must be factors other than attention that act as 
a barrier to using the associativity shortcut (e.g. working memory, inhibition, shifting), and these 
factors therefore warrant further investigation.   
We offer five explanations for why we found no evidence for the role of attention in the 
identification of the associativity shortcut. These explanations concern 1) the statistical power of the 
studies, 2) strength of the attention manipulation, 3) inadequate conceptual knowledge, 4) 
conflicting knowledge and 5) the demands of the task. These explanations are not mutually 
exclusive. We now discuss each of these in turn. 
Statistical power
Each experiment was powered to detect a medium-size effect (W = 0.30) for a 3*2 chi-square test 
for the number of identifiers, which we deemed to be the smallest effect size of interest and our 
primary outcome measure (note that we found effect sizes of 0.19 and 0.07 in Study 1 and 2 
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respectively). Each study was powered to at least 80% (Cohen, 1988) and required 108 participants, 
a number which we deemed to be practically achievable. One consequence is that, if the alternative 
hypothesis is true in the population, we had a 20% chance of failing to find that effect significant in 
each study (Type II error). However, by conducting two studies at the same level of power (80%), the 
chance of obtaining a null result in both, given that the alternative hypothesis is true in the 
population, declines to 4%. We therefore judge that overall our studies had enough power to detect 
a medium or larger effect size, and that there are better alternative explanations of our results.  
Strength of the manipulation 
The attention manipulations in both studies were subtle, reflected by the fact that some participants 
(approximately 30% in Experiment 1, and 14% in Experiment 2) did not report being aware of the 
manipulations when questioned at the end of the experiment. Other manipulations of attention may 
have a different effect. We intentionally avoided any stronger manipulation: with a longer prime 
duration than that used in Experiment 1, any difference between the conditions, had one been 
found, could have been due to the initiation of computation, rather than attention. Separately, any 
stronger spacing manipulation than that used in Experiment 2 could have made the stimuli look 
unusual, and confused participants.  
We judge that our attention manipulations were sufficient for three reasons. First, most participants 
were aware of the manipulations (69% and 86% in Experiment 1 and 2 respectively), and re-analysis 
of the data excluding those who were not aware made no difference to the outcome of the primary 
analyses. Secondly, the same prime that we used in Study 1 did produce an effect in the study by 
Dubé & Robinson (2010) in the context of inversion problems (where the primes were “a + b” and “b 
− b”), suggesting that the attention manipulation can be effective. Finally, smaller spacing 
manipulations have been found to influence the order in which operations are performed (Jiang et 
al. 2014, p.1629), suggesting that they only need to be subtle to produce an effect. We therefore 
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think that the strength of the manipulation is an unlikely explanation for why we found no difference 
among the conditions. 
Inadequate knowledge
Our results are not directly related to the model of SCADS* (Siegler & Araya, 2005) because it was 
primarily developed from inversion problems, while we were concerned with associativity. 
Associativity and inversion are different, with the former more difficult than the latter (Robinson & 
Dube, 2017): individuals are much older when they start to use associativity shortcuts compared to 
inversion shortcuts, and are more likely to prefer using a left-to-right procedure on associativity than 
inversion problems (Robinson & Dubé, 2012). For a prime to facilitate shortcut identification, it 
seems sensible to assume that an individual must have some level of knowledge of the principle 
from which it is derived, because attention mechanisms alone would be unlikely to teach new 
strategies. Thus, attention manipulations might facilitate the identification of inversion shortcuts 
because adults understand the principle. In contrast, the same manipulations may not be sufficient 
for associativity because it is a principle that adults may not understand. 
Indeed, for the one study that has included associativity problems (Dubé & Robinson, 2010), our 
results are entirely consistent. Dubé & Robinson (2010) found no difference in accuracy and 
response time on associativity problems in the domain of multiplication-division. Here, we report no 
difference in the domain of addition-subtraction. Using the same procedure for manipulating 
attention (Experiment 1), similar outcome measures (accuracy and response time), and our newly 
developed measure that more sensitively measures the time-point of identification, we replicated 
their preliminary finding that attention manipulations do not alter performance on associativity 
problems. It is therefore unlikely that the lack of evidence for a role of attention is due to the specific 
outcome measures chosen, or a Type II error in one particular study. Rather, the evidence is more 
consistent with the explanation that attention is less important for the identification of associativity 
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shortcuts and that other factors, such as knowledge of the principle, are stronger determinants of 
shortcut use. 
Other researchers have similarly suggested that perceptual manipulations in stimuli only help 
individuals with sufficient conceptual knowledge (Jiang et al., 2014). For example, in two 
interventions, Alibali and colleagues (Alibali, 2015; Alibali et al., 2017) aimed to improve 8 – 11 year 
olds’ understanding of equivalence, using ink colour as a perceptual support. They found that solving 
equivalence problems with an equals sign presented in red ink led to better problem reconstruction 
and strategy generation, compared to a group without that support. However, they also noted that 
not all individuals benefited equally, and that perceptual support was more effective for those “close 
to correct performance” (Alibali et al, 2017, p.10). These individuals, they argued, required only 
minimal scaffolding to achieve a complete understanding of equivalence, which the perceptual 
manipulations provided. Thus, the individuals in our studies may have had insufficient knowledge to 
benefit from similar manipulations.
Conflicting knowledge
One relatively common but unexpected response to the question “Why did you not use the right-to-
left strategy?” was “BODMAS” (Brackets, Order, Division, Multiplication, Addition, Subtraction), an 
acronym taught at around the age of 11 years in the UK to help children remember the order in 
which arithmetic operations should be performed. The acronym intends to highlight the precedence 
of multiplication and division over addition and subtraction, while not prescribing any precedence 
between multiplication and division, or between addition and subtraction. However, these 
responses indicate that some adults have a literal interpretation of BODMAS and ascribe precedence 
to addition over subtraction. These individuals may never use a shortcut on ‘a + b − c’ problems, 
because they believe it would not be permitted by a rule they had learnt.    
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Indeed, we are not the first to identify misinterpretations with BODMAS; during interviews with 
prospective primary-school teachers, Zakis & Rouleau (2017) found that 55% believed that division 
should be performed before multiplication. Interestingly, in the United States, where the literal 
order of multiplication and division are reversed in the acronym PEMDAS, 38% of prospective 
teachers believed the opposite, that multiplication should precede division (Glidden, 2008). To avoid 
misinterpretations, teachers have been found to encourage a left-to-right approach on problems 
that contain operations at equal levels (Kirshner, 1989) and this situation is particularly problematic 
for addition-subtraction associativity. A literal interpretation of BODMAS, and the remedy to 
overcome that literal interpretation (‘go left to right’), both suggest associativity shortcuts are not 
allowed. Thus, for some individuals, conceptual knowledge and procedural knowledge may conflict, 
and attention mechanisms would be unlikely to correct this. Individuals may understand 
associativity, but procedures or ‘rules’ which they have learnt interfere when applying it.  
Task demands
There were two features in our task that may have hindered shortcut use, 1) the demands of 
switching between two strategies, and 2) the validity of the primes. As in previous literature (e.g. 
Dubé & Robinson, 2010; Robinson & Dubé, 2013; Robinson & Ninowski, 2003) we intermixed the 
order in which different problems (i.e. conducive and non-conducive problems) were presented. This 
may have increased switching demands because efficient performance required alternating between 
left-to-right and right-to-left strategies, depending on the problem. Individuals have often been 
found reluctant to change from using one strategy to another within tasks (Lovett & Anderson, 1996; 
Siegler & Lemaire, 1997; Schillemans, Luwel, Onghena, & Verschaffel, 2011; Schillemans, Luwel, 
Ceulemans, Onghena, & Verschaffel, 2012; Verschaffel, Luwel, Torbeyns, & Van Dooren, 2009). In 
our studies, individuals may have been reluctant to switch from a strategy which “worked” (left-to-
right) on both problem types, to one which also “worked” (right-to-left) but was more efficient for 
half of the problems. 
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Indeed, this could explain why our findings differ from the aforementioned perceptual studies that 
used spacing manipulations (Jiang et al., 2014; Landy & Goldstone, 2007; Landy et al., 2008). In their 
studies, the stimuli contained operations that were not associative, e.g. ‘25 − 10 + 2 × 3’, which 
afford only one correct strategy: multiplication, then subtraction, then addition. Efficiency and 
accuracy influence individuals’ evaluations of different problem solving strategies (Brown, 
Menendez, & Alibali, 2019). Furthermore, it has been found that individuals are more likely to switch 
strategies if the difference between them is one of accuracy, rather than efficiency (Siegler, 2007). In 
other words, individuals are more willing to switch from a strategy which produces an incorrect 
result to one which produces a correct result; they are less willing to switch from a correct strategy 
to another correct strategy just to save time (Siegler, 2007). Individuals in the previous studies may 
have therefore been more willing to abandon a left-to-right approach than the participants in our 
studies because, in contrast to associativity stimuli, order mattered.
Finally, it may have been that the primes were perceived as invalid cues. Cue validity is “the 
conditional probability that an object is in a particular category, given its possession of some feature 
or cue” (Murphy, 1982). In psychology, this translates into the observation that the influence of a 
cue (e.g. an alarm) on behaviour towards a target (e.g. a fire) is proportional to the number of times 
that the stimuli co-occur, divided by the number of times that they do not. In other words, if the cue 
reliably predicts the onset of the target, the cue is informative, relevant and the individual adjusts 
their behaviour accordingly (e.g. to escape). If not, the cue is less relevant and may be ignored. This 
cue validity effect is widely documented and robust (Posner & Petersen, 1990; Eckstein, Abbey, 
Pham, & Shimozaki, 2004; Eckstein, Drescher, & Shimozaki, 2006; Jollie, Ivanoff, Webb, & Jamieson, 
2016). In the current studies, the primes were valid on only 50% of the trials. For example, in the 
right-prime conditions, the prime cued the more efficient strategy on the conducive trials only. On 
non-conducive trials, the prime was not helpful, or even worse, unhelpful, to the extent that a left-
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to-right procedure was more efficient. Thus, it could be expected that some individuals ignored the 
primes because they were not beneficial for every trial.  
Conclusion
We developed a new tool that can be used by other researchers investigating the development of 
conceptual understanding and strategy use in a range of domains. For the first time, we measured 
shortcut use on a trial-by-trial basis using implicit (response time) data without relying on explicit 
self-reports after each arithmetic problem was solved. This allowed us to capture  the time-point of 
arithmetic strategy change. In two studies we used this method to investigate whether manipulating 
attention could encourage the identification of an associativity shortcut on ‘a + b − c’ problems and 
in both studies, we found no evidence that attention encouraged or hindered identification. We 
offer five explanations of our results and suggest that the most likely reasons for why individuals did 
not use the shortcut may be a) the demands of the task or b) inadequate or conflicting knowledge of 
the associativity principle. Given the importance of associativity in students’ later algebra learning, 
further research into why the principle is poorly understood is warranted.
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Figure captions
Figure 1
The procedure of a trial in the left-prime, right-prime and control conditions in Experiment 1
Figure 2
Trial-by-trial RT data for one participant. The identification-point refers the time-point at which the 
individual changed from using a less efficient (e.g. left-to-right) strategy, to a more efficient 
associativity-shortcut strategy. 
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 Figure 1: The procedure of a trial in the left-prime, right-prime and control conditions in Experiment 1 
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 Figure 2: Trial-by-trial RT data for one participant. The identification-point refers the time-point at which the 
individual changed from using a less efficient (e.g. left-to-right) strategy, to a more efficient associativity-
shortcut strategy. 
257x190mm (150 x 150 DPI) 
Page 57 of 61 Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60 DOI: 10.1177/1747021820905739
Table 1
Number of associativity shortcut identifiers and non-identifiers in each condition of Experiment 1.
Condition
Left-prime Control Right-prime Total
Identifier 19 17 25 61
Non-identifier 17 19 11 47
Total 36 36 36 108
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Table 2
Mean trial number (SD) of identification for the associativity shortcut identifiers in Experiment 1.
Condition
Left-prime Control Right-prime
Conducive trial number 8.00 (3.73) 6.71 (3.60) 6.44 (5.36)
Overall trial number 15.58 (7.41) 13.12 (7.11) 12.52 (10.49)
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Table 3
Mean accuracy and median correct RT across all trials for participants who identified the associativity 
shortcut (Experiment 1)
Conducive problems Non-conducive problems
Condition Accuracy (%) RT (s) Accuracy (%) RT (s)
Left-prime 91.99 (8.85) 4.92 (2.77) 78.95 (24.78) 11.03 (4.33)
Control 90.28 (15.26) 6.14 (2.28) 79.54 (20.26) 13.65 (5.40)
Right-prime 94.43 (6.09) 6.61 (6.01) 82.09 (12.70) 12.42 (5.95)
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Table 4
Number of identifiers and non-identifiers of the associativity shortcut in each condition of 
Experiment 2.
Condition
Left-prime Control Right-prime Total
Identifier 18 17 20 55
Non-identifier 18 19 16 53
Total 36 36 36 108
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